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cised in good faith. Support for this view might be found in the analogy
that the exercise of a power of appointment will be void as a fraud on the
powef if the donee merely fails to carry out the donor's purpose. ° But the
analogy is not compelling, for the object of the rule concerning powers of ap-
pointment is to avoid "defrauding" the donor, while here the only person
who might be considered "defrauded" is the displaced beneficiary. And a
beneficiary whose interests are thus destroyed has not been unduly prejudiced
since, from their inception, his interests were subject to divestment by any
exercise of the reserved power of alteration. Inasmuch as the settlor dearly
had the power under the instrument to invest himself with the whole benefi-
cial interest of the trust, it seems that nothing is to be gained by withholding
the legal interest.
STATE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION LAWS
STATE HOMESTEAD laws exempting the debtor's home within designated
limits of space and value from judicial sale at the suit of creditors are a
familiar part of the American legal scene.' The absence of any recent or
relatively brief discussion of this segment of the law suggests a study of
its legislative and judicial history, comparable legal trends in other countries,
and the present developments in this field in the United States.
Homestead laws are essentially American in their origin.2 A precedent
for such enactments has indeed been found by the courts in the early com-
mon law where feudal principles forbade the alienation or encumbrance of
the fief.3 There is no evidence, however, that this land law, serving its
110. See (1936) 46 YAI.r L. J. 344.
1. These laws must be distinguished from the federal homestead legrilation, %-Tbch
seeks to encourage the colonization of outlying districts by granting the qualified appli-
cant a quarter section or less of unappropriated public land after he has occupied and
cultivated it for a certain period. This land is exempt from all debts contracted prior
to the acquisition of title but not from those incurred thereafter. Rzv. STAT. §§ 22Z9,
2291, 2296 (1875), 43 U.S. C. §§ 161, 164, 175 (1934). State homestead laws, on tht
other hand, affect land already owned by the beneficiary and only exempt it from debts
incurred subsequent to its dedication. VAPLEs, Hon srnm Aim Ex m-wvoi (1S93) 924.
Federal homestead legislation is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a brief
discussion, see id., at 924-953.
2. Rox x, Asr.s DE Fma. EX SUIssE (1926) 17; Vance, Homestead Exemp-
tlion Laws (1932) 7 ENcyc. Soc. Scr xczs 441.
3. In re Vogler, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,986 (NV. D. N. C. 1873) ; Norton v. Bradham,
21 S. C. 375 (1884); see THotmsoN, HouIE TEAD AND Ex 0?XOn LAws (1878) §4.
By the nineteenth- century the debtor's lands could generally be subjected to Sale
for the nonpayment of his debts. Prather, Economic Effects of the Homestead a 4
Exemption Laws (Unpublished thesis in New York Public Library, 19 3) 17-18.
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special political ends, had any influence upon the proponents of homestead
legislation, and the alleged connection seems an afterthought on the part
of the American courts, seeking to justify their conclusion that these laws
should be liberally rather than strictly construed.4 The earlier laws dealing
with chattel exemptions appear to be the true forerunner of homestead
legislation. 5 In the United States, the first third of the nineteenth century
was the heyday of prosecutions for debt, and the unfortunate condition of
the debtor aroused the attention of legislators and philanthropists.0 America,
with its primitive conditions, was also peculiarly interested in encouraging
the pioneer, and protecting him against the financial hazards of his life.
It is therefore not surprising to find the rise of chattel exemption laws, which,
although they have their prototypes in common law rules,7 were a response
to frontier conditions,8 and, like the indulgent bankruptcy laws, a mani-
festation of the political influence exerted by the small-debtor class through-
out the history of American life.9 The main functions of such laws were
to protect the family, 10 to enable the debtor to retain his independent status
and to encourage the pursuit of professions or skilled trades."' These laws
spread rapidly throughout the Union,12 and exist today in all of the states
and in the District of Columbia, as well as in numerous foreign countries. 10
4. See Vance, loc. cit. supra note 2. It is significant that no reference to this
feudal land law appears to have been made in the various constitutional and legislative
debates on homestead exemptions. See VACHER, LE HOMESTEAD AUX ETATs-UNIs
(1895) 121.
5. See VAcHER, loc. cit. szpra note 4.
6. 5 CHANNING, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1930) 192; see Vermont Chron-
icle, Jan. 24, 1849, p. 13, col. 2.
7. At an early date restrictions were placed upon the distraint of chattels neces-
sary to the debtor's economic existence. 51 HEN. 3, st. 4 (1266) (no distress upon
sheep) ; 52 HEN. 3, c.c. 1, 2, 4, 15 (1267) (penalties prescribed for unlawful distress) ;
28 EDW. 1, c. 12 (1300) (beasts of the plough to be distrained upon only as a last
resort).
8. See Vance, supra note 2, at 442.
9. See WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935) 49-92.
10. This is indicated by the fact that often their benefits were restricted to heads
of families, that the right of exemption frequently passed upon the death of the owner
to the surviving spouse and children, and that the chattels usually exempted included
family clothing, household furniture, necessary provisions and such tools as were neces-
sary to enable the breadwinner to continue in his trade or profession. Typical among
the early statutes are Me. Laws 1821, c. 95; Mass. Laws 1805, c. 100; N. Y. Laws
1810, appearing in 6 WEBSTER, LAWS OF NEW YORK (1812) 83; Tenn. Laws 1833, c. 80.
11. See Sallee v. Waters, 17 Ala. 482, 489 (1850); Lambeth v. Milton, 2 Rob. 81,
F2 (La. 1842) ; Harrison v. Martin, 7 Mo. 286, 287 (1842).
12. By 1845, at least fifteen states had chattel exemption laws. Prather, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 18.
13. See, e.g., 2 ALBERTA REv. STAT. (1922) 1113-1114; 2 MANITOBA Ray. STAT.
(1913) 1025-1027.
1024 [Vol. 46: 1023
STATE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION LAWS
The first step towards the enactment of comparable legislation to preserve
the family hearth is to be found in Texas, which at that time was under
Mexican government and far removed from the inhibitions of the common
law-Y4 In 1821, Moses Austin secured through the governor of Texas a
huge grant of land on which to establish three hundred families. Austin's
grant was followed by similar grants to other impresarios until substantially all
of Texas was laid open to immigration, and within ten years tie population
of Texas had increased to twenty thousand.1 5 Many of these immigrants
had left the United States in an effort to escape from their creditors,"0 and
this circumstance led Austin's son and successor, Stephen, to propose a stay
law exempting their property in Texas for twelve years from execution to
pay debts contracted before immigration, in order that they might be given
an opportunity to develop their lands properly.'7 In supporting this legis-
lation, Austin relied not only upon its economic advantages, but also had
recourse to a Spanish precedent,"" which, antedating the American chattel
exemptions by several centuries, was similar to them in scope and effectY'O
Whichever argument prevailed, a law was passed in 1829 providing that
lands acquired by virtue of the colonization laws should not be subject for
a period of twelve years to the payment of debts contracted previous to their
acquisition, and declaring that after that time the colonists should be obli-
gated to pay them only in money or products "in a manner not to affect
their attention to their families, their husbandry, or art they profess." Farm-
ing utensils and implements of trade were also specifically exempted.P This
14. 1 BEARD, RISE OF AmmUCAN Cxvxiuz 0io (1928) 587; Vance, supm note 2,
at 44Z
15. 1 BER z, loc. cit. supra note 14; cf. 1 Foorn, TEXAS AND Tim TExm.s (1841)
225.
16. EDwARI. HISTORY oF TExAs (1836) 179; STrIF, TEXAN Eu nwmrr (1840) 53.
It has been suggested, however, that a primary factor contributing to this immigration
was the fear experienced by many southerners that slavery would shortly be abolished
in the United States. See FoURNEI., Ln TEXAS (1841) 42.
17. Memorial to the Legislature, Dec. 22, 1824 [reprinted in 2 BAUrMM, TnE Aun
PERS (1919) 996-1000]; see BAiucm, LIF OF STEi~nm F. Ausri (1926) 221.
18. Letter from Austin to Zavala, June 24, 1828 [reprinted in 2 BAnrm, Tim
AusTr PAPRS (1922) 47-51].
19. A translation of this law is to be found in 1 Wnir, NEw CoL.Ecrorr OF LAws,
CHARTERS AXD LOCAL ORDINANCES OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND SPAMn (1839) 322-
324. This law has often been considered a precedent for the subsequent chattel exemp-
tion and homestead statutes. See Cobbs v. Coleman, 14 Tex. 594, 598 (1855); NUmIM,
TEXAS HoMEsTEAD (1931) 2; ,VOOTEN. HIsToRY OF TEXAS (1899) 273.
20. KIMBALL, LAWS AND DECREES oF THE STATE OF COHAHUILA AN TEXAs (1839)
110-111. There are indications that this law relieved a good deal of anxiety among
the colonists. See letter from Peter Ellis Bean to Austin, March 18, 1829 [reprinted
in 2 BARnER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 192]: "I gave you thanks for the Copey of the
Law that Delebrate the Settlers of this Cuntrey from Paying Debts Before Contracted
untill 12 years after the Date it will give Roome for men to make Property and not
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statute differed from the subsequent homestead exemption laws in that it
protected only land acquired through governmental grant, and this only as
against debts contracted prior to its acquisition. To this extent, it might
well be considered a prototype of the present federal homestead law, although
its purpose was in part different. 2'
In 1839, after the establishment of the Texan Republic, this statute gave
)lace to the first of all homestead exemption laws, which has served as a
todel for later legislation in many other American states. 22 This law pro-
vided that there should be reserved free from execution to each head of a
family "fifty acres of land, or one town lot, including his or her homestead
or improvements, not exceeding five hundred dollars in value," and also
provided for certain chattel exemptions of the type already discussed.28 A
similar provision with larger exemptions was incorporated into the Texas
constitutions of 1845, 1861 and 1866,24 while in the constitutions of 1869
and 1876 the anount of the allowable exemption was increased still further.25
This trend towards an ever increasing liberality is still in evidence at the
present day in homestead legislation as a whole.20
After 1839, the spread of homestead laws across the country was rapid.
Such legislation was adopted by Georgia and Mississippi in 1841,27 by Wis-
consin in 1848,28 and by Iowa and Vermont in 1 8 4 9 ." In the latter year,
California placed a homestead provision in its constitution, 0 while in 1850
be Broke up as it has bin the wish of Some to Buy in the united Staits at and under
value those Debts for spacilasion. But I am hapy that thare is astop to all."
21. The underlying policy of this law would appear more nearly in accord with
that of the state homestead statutes, which seek rather to preserve the home than to
encourage immigration. See notes 62-72, infra.
22. See Roco v. Green, 50 Tex. 483, 488 (1878); SraE, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHITS
IN TEXAS (3d ed. 1929) § 453.
23. 2 GAMmEL, LAWS OF TEXAS (1898) 125-126.
24. Under these constitutions, the legislature was empowered to declare exempt
from the claims of creditors a rural homestead of not more than two hundred acres
or an urban homestead not exceeding $2,000:in value. TEX. CoNsT. art. VII, §22
(1845); TEX. CONsT. art. VII, §22 (1861); TEX. CoNsT. art. VII, §22 (1866).
25. The constitution of 1869 required the legislature to protect from forced sale
a rural homestead of not more than two hundred acres or an urban homestead not
exceeding $5,000 in value at the time of its designation without reference to the value
of improvements thereon. TEX. CoNsT. art. XII, § 15 (1869).
The homestead provisions in the present constitution of 1876 are in the main similar
to those in the constitution of 1869, but they also permit a "business homestead" to be
held exempt from creditors. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50-52 (1876); NUNN, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 3-5.
26. Cf. Vance, supra note 2, at 442.
27. COBB, STATUTES OF GEORGIA (1846) 100-101; Miss. Laws 1841, c. 15, p. 113.
28. Wis. Laws 1848, pp. 40-41.
29. Iowa Laws 1849, c. 124, pp. 152-153; Vt. Laws 1849, no. 20, pp. 14-16.
30. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 15 (1849).
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similar enactments were passed by the legislatures of New York and OhioPF
At the present time, homestead exemption laws exist in all of the states with
the exception of Delaware, Rhode Island and the District of Columbia.
Twenty-five states have incorporated these principles into their constitu-
tions. In nine of these, the constitutions require the legislature to pass home-
stead exemption laws without specifying the details of such legislation, 2
while the sole provision in the Mississippi Constitution is to the effect that
the legislature shall not be prevented from regulating the sale of home-
steads.33 In Georgia, the debtor is permitted to select either a homestead
of the type whose details are set forth in the constitution, or what is termed
a statutory "short" homestead, but he cannot have both.3 ' In Utah, the
legislature has extended the limits of monetary yalue set by the constitution
upon the homestead,3 5 while in Alabama the maximum acreage established
by the constitution for rural homesteads has been increased by legislative
enactment from eighty to one hundred and sixty acres."0 In the thirteen
remaining states, the legislatures have adopted the various constitutional
provisions dealing with homestead exemptions.37
The statutes themselves present countless diversities. At the present time,
the limitations set upon the value of the exempt homestead range from $103
to $8,000,31 and those upon the extent of rural acreage from forty'3 to
31. N.Y. Laws 1850, c. 260, pp. 499-500; Ohio Laws 1850, pp. 29-31.
32. CQ&. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 1; COLo. Coxs,. art. XVIII, § 1; IuL. CoNS?. art IV,
§32; MoNr. CoNsT. art. XIX, §4; NEv. CoNsT. art. IV, §30; N. D. CONs-. art. XVIL
§208; S. D. CoNsT. art. XXI, §4; WAsH. CoxsT. art. XIX, §1; Wyo. CousT. art.
XIX, §9.
33. Miss. CONsT. art. IV, § 94.
34. GA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 4.
35. The Utah constitution provides for a homestead of at least $1,500 in value.
UTAH CoNsr. art. XXII, § 1. The legislature has raised this amount to 200 for the
head of the family and has also exempted a further sum of V50 for the spouse, and
$300 for each additional member of the family. UTAH REv. STAT. Am. (1933) § 3--0-1.
36. The Alabama constitution exempts a rural homestead "not exceeding eighty
acres." AsL. CoNsT. art. X, § 205. But the statute enlarging this exemption fAL&
CODE ANN. (1928) § 7882] has been upheld by the courts. David's Adm'r v. David,
56 Ala. 49 (1876).
37. Anx. CoNsT. art. IX, §§ 3-6; FA. CoNsT. art. X, §§ 1-6; GA. CoNsT. art. IX,
§§1-9; KAN. CoxsT. art. XV, § 9; La. CoNs?. art. XI, §§ 1-4; Mixca. Cous. art.
XIV, §§2-4; N. C. CONs?. art. X, §§2-5, 8; OKA. CoNsT, art. XII, §51-3; S. C.
CONsT. art. III, §28; TENN. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11; Trx. CONs?. art. XVI, §§ SQ-52;
VA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 190-193; V. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, §48.
At one time, the Tennessee legislature increased the value of the homestead, as
provided for in the constitution, from $1,000 to $2,000. Tm.E. CoDE (Williams, 1932)
§ 7719. The exemption was again reduced to $1,000 in 1933. TEm. Comz Aim. (Wil-
lhams, 1934) § 7719.
38. MD. ANN. CoDE (Bagby, 1924) art. 83, § 8.
39. N. D. Cmp. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 5605.
40. IOWA CODE (1935) § 10136; Mfxcri. Coup. Lws (1929) §14603.
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three hundred and twenty acres, 41 with one hundred and sixty acres as the
most common allotment. Often no differentiation is made between city and
country holdings and the sole limitation is one of value, which most com-
monly is $1,000.42 The area of the urban homestead is rarely limited, but
where this is done, it is usually set at less than one acre.4 3 While the history
of homestead legislation does not appear to be that of a sectional move-
ment, in general, lower exemptions are found in the east than in the south
and west.
4
Not every landowner is entitled to the homestead privilege. To be exempt,
the land must ordinarily be occupied as a residence by the debtor and his
family,45 although in Texas, a "business" homestead may be claimed as well
as one for use as a home.4 6 Similarly, the privilege of claiming the exemp-
tion is usually restricted to a "householder" or to the "head of a family.' 47
These terms are rarely defined by the statutes, but where this is done, they
are not limited to those in a marital or parental relationship, and are made
to include any person who as the result of close kinship is under the moral
obligation of supporting those living with him under the same roof.48 In
California and Idaho, however, homesteads of lesser value may be claimed
41. MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 6968.
42. Vance, supra note 2, at 442. The constitutions of Kansas [KAN. CONsT. art.
XV, § 9] and Florida [FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 1], on the other hand, place no limit other
than extent upon both urban and rural homesteads. For a criticism of these provisions,
see Cole, Homestead Provisions in the Texas Consti.ution (1925) 3 TEx. L. REV. 217,
222-223.
Where no limit other than extent is set upon the homestead, a subsequent increase
in the value of the land will be exempt from creditors. WAPLES, op. Cit. supra note 1,
at 218-219. Where the monetary value of the homestead is restricted, there is a
conflict of authority as to whether a rise in value will redound to the benefit of credi-
tors. Vanstory v. Thornton, 110 N. C. 10, 14 S. E. 637 (1892) (increase in value of
homestead held subject to execution); Morton v. Jones, 136 Ky. 797, 125 S. W. 247
(1910) (increase in value held immune from creditors); TnoMPson, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 109.
43. In Missouri, however, the urban homestead may be as large as five acres when
the village or town in which it is situated has a population of less than ten thousand.
Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 608. In North Dakota, an urban homestead of two
acres may be claimed. N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 5605.
44. It is significant that some of the eastern states were among the first to adopt
this legislation. See notes 29, 31, supra.
45. WAPLES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 6.
46. See note 25, supra. It has been said that the combined value of these cannot
exceed $5,000 at the time of designation. See St. Louis Brewing Ass'n v. Walker,
23 Tex. Civ. App. 6, 7, 54 S.W. 360, 361 (1899).
47. WAPLES, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 57.
48. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1261; MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 6969. The exemption privilege is sometimes extended
to widows and widowers, though without children, who continue to occupy the family
homestead. IowA CODE (1935) § 10151; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) § 450.
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by other than heads of families,49 while in Minnesota, Oregon and Wiscon-
sin, the exemption exists in favor of any resident,5 0 as is probably true in
Vermont where the privilege is granted to any "natural person.'" 1
The acquisition of the exemption privilege entails a decrease in the ovmer's
power to transfer his lands freely. Where he is married, the consent of
his wife is usually made a prerequisite to the alienation or encumbrance of
the homestead.5 2 His power of testamentary disposition is also limited by
the provision that upon his death the homestead shall remain exempt from
his debts to the use of his widow and minor children. In a few states, the
homestead vests in them absolutely, r but in most jurisdiction it descends
either by will or to the heirs of the deceased in the normal course of descent
and distribution after the widow has died and the youngest child has attained
majority.t r
The statutes usually provide that the homestead may be subjected to sale
for the non-payment of certain debts or liens. Preexisting liens and taxes
belong almost invariably to this category, and purchase money mortgages,
mechanics', laborers' and materialmen's liens, when these are derived from
improvements placed on the premises, are often given a privileged status.z
Methods are also prescribed whereby creditors can reach the land claimed
as exempt to the extent that it exceeds statutory limits. Typically, the credi-
tor may have the land appraised, and if a surplus is found to exist, the
surplus may be sold for payment of the debt; or if the character of the
land makes such a division impracticable, the entire plot may be sold, reserv-
49. CAL CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1260; IDANO CODE ANN. (1932) § 54-1201.
In Georgia, the homestead may be claimed by every "aged, or infirm person" [G.
CoxsT. art. IX, § 1], and in Wyoming, by any resident of the state who has attained
the age of 60 years. Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 89-294.
50. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8336; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 3-201; Wis.
STAT. (1931) § 272-20. These statutes are so construed in Ferguson v. Kumler, 27
Minn. 156, 159, 6 N. W. 618, 619 (1880); Smith v. Kay, 153 Ore. 90, 90, 54 P. (2d)
1160, 1163 (1936); Myers v. Ford, 22 Wis. 139, 141 (1867).
51. VT. PuB. LAWS (1934) § 2559.
52. ,VAPLES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 383. In Georgia and Texas, no valid mortgage
can be placed upon the homestead save for the purchase money or for improvements
placed upon the premises. GA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2; TEx. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 50. In
Georgia, the debtor may vaive his right to the exemption at any time before the
homestead is formally set apart. GA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 3; see IsAAc, Hoxxsw
WAIvERS AND AsSIGNMENrs (1923) §§ 2-5.
53. KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 22-102; MAfNN. STAT. (Mfason, Supp. 1935)
§ 8992-27; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 101-4-6.
54. Vance, supra note 2, at 443. In several states, the homestead is exempt from
the creditors of the surviving spouse [see e.g., Nm. CoUp. STAT. (1929) §40-117;
OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 1225] and of the minor children [see, e.g., Iow& Conz
(1935) § 10153].
55. See, e.g., CAL. CnV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1241; GA. CoDE (1933) §51-101;
Vance, supra note 2, at 443.
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ing to the debtor from the proceeds of the sale the monetary value of the
exemption,56 often made immune from all execution for a stated period. 1
In several states, creditors are further protected by the provision that the
exemption will not take effect until a description of the land is filed with the
designated official, 8 while in Georgia the homestead must actually be set
off under the direction of a court of justice.59 It is more usual, however, to
allow the debtor to claim the privilege at any time before the judicial sale, 0
while a few states place the levying officer under the affirmative duty to
set off the exempt land on his own initiative.61
The purposes of homestead laws are apparent in their history and scope.
Perhaps their primary objective is to protect the family from the hazards
of circumstance or from the improvidence of its head.62 Evidence of this
may be found in the fact that the exemption inheres only to the family resi-
dence and the lands appurtenant thereto; that it can be claimed only by
householders with a family; and that the debtor's wife and minor children
are protected by restrictions upon his power to alienate or encumber the
homestead or to dispose of it by will, the only exceptions to such restrictions
being the provisions allowing encumbrances to be incurred in acquiring
or improving the home, as in the case of purchase money mortgages,
mechanics', laborers' and materialmen's liens.63 Another aim of these laws
was undoubtedly to protect and encourage home ownership, not only as a
56. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1735; IlL. ANN. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 52, §§ 10-12.
57. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1257. The consent of the owner's
wife is often a prerequisite to the distribution of the proceeds of the sale. See, e.g.,
NEV. CoMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 3317.
The proceeds from a voluntary sale of the homestead are often made exempt for
a stated period, and in such instances the consent of the owner's wife is also a usual
prerequisite to their alienation. See, e.g., NEB. ComP. STAT. (1929) §40-116.
58. See, e.g., LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §§ 3805, 3806; Nm. Com.up. LAWS
(Hillyer, 1929) §3315. In some states, the word "Homestead" must be entered in
the margin of the record title to the land before the exemption can become effective.
See, e.g., COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 3378-9.
59. GA. CODE (1933) § 51-201; cf. N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c. 214, § 16.
60. See, e.g., ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §3-204; VT. PUB. LAWS (1934) §2560.
61. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LA~Ws (1929) § 14610; S. D. CoMp. LAWS (1929) § 461.
62. See SPEER, op. cit. supra note 22, § 454; THOmPSoN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1;
WAPias, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3-4. In advocating the adoption of such laws, their
proponents in the various constitutional conventions appear to have relied mainly upon
the protection which they would afford the debtor's family. "I do think that this idea
of homestead is one of the sublimest ideas of our age. It is a principle which has
sought form and shape, and come like an angel of mercy to hover over and bless
the families of our nation." Collins, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF NEVADA (1864) 287. And see PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
CALIFORNIA (1849) 269; 1 PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ILLINOIS
(1869-70) 895, 897, 899, 900.
63. See notes 45-55, supra.
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stimulus to diligence and high morals, but also as a means of enlisting the
individual's self-interest in the preservation of established rights and in the
promotion of general prosperity.04
In the south and west, there were still other reasons for the enactment
of such legislation which may account for the larger exemptions existing
there. Among these reasons were the frontier conditions and the agricultural
character of most of the communities in those regions, factors tvhich natur-
ally lead to the encouragement and facilitation of home ownership.P Then
too, it was felt that homestead laws would redound to the benefit of the
small farmer by discouraging the granting of easy credit, which was thought
likely to prove disastrous to him."O The present homestead laws of the
southern states date in the most part from the Reconstruction Era, and were
largely influenced by the then prevalent distress,67 which intensified the
demand for debtor-relief and gave the debates in the various constitutional
conventions upon this subject the atmosphere'of a class struggle.P Con-
flicting desires as to immigration were further motivating factors behind .the
liberal exemptions of the south and west, for the southern states hoped to
prevent the exodus of their inhabitants by the passage of such laws, while
their western neighbors sought to attract settlers through the same media.
The modification of the usual incidents of the debtor-creditor relationship
worked by homestead legislation has naturally given rise to a formidable
64. See 1 BENTON, THIrr YEARs' VEw (1854) 103-104; Journal of he Rev.
John Taylor in 3 O'CALrAGHAr, DocuISENTARY HIsToay OF Nsw Yo= (1850) 1136,
1148; Dillon, Homestead Exemption (1862) 10 Am . L REG. 641, 647; N. Y. Tribime,
April 11, 1850, p. 4, col 1.
65. See RoEEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 23-24; Vance, supra note 2, at 442.
66. See VAcam, op. cit. supra note 4, at 224-225; Poteat, Deblor Exemptios:
A Study in Credit Administration (Unpublished thesis in Yale Law School Library,
1933) 28, 29, 31. This argument was often used in the various constitutional co=--=-
tions. See 1 PROCEEDINGs OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENMON OF INDIANA (1850) 766
770-771; DEBATES OF THE CONsrrTIoNAL CoNv or0no OF TExAs (1845) 421.
67. 6 RHoDEs, ISTORY OF THE UNiTE STATES (1905) 75, 77.
6& "I remember in times gone by the State of South Carolina has been ruled by
the rich for the rich.... Thank God, we intend to be retrospective, to wipe out
forever, if possible, this terrible heel of despotism." Moses, in 2 PROcEEDINGS oF CONT-
sTrrtToNAL CoNvENTiON OF SourH CAROLINA (1868) 494, 495. And see Proa-smcs
OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF GEORGIA (1877) 4, E6, 450.
Distressed financial conditions were motivating factors behind the adoption of home-
stead exemption laws in all parts of the country. See Sun..ON, LAD SysTm.s Aim
LAND Poucms IN NaASKA (1936) 66, n. 92; Dillon, supra note 64, at 641; 2 Prz-
cEEDiNGs OF CoNSTrruTIONxAL CoNVENTIoN oF UTAH (1895) 1774.
69. See SmnrH, LAw OF Ho sTEAD AND ExEmnrioNs (1875) § 14; Sizn=;uon,
PoLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PuBLic LANDS (1917) 150; PocEINGS oF CorisTrruTiorTAL
CoNVENION OF GEORGIA (1877) 452; 1 PROCEEDINGS OF CoNsTrruTIoNAL ConvrnorT
op ILLIN IS (1869-1870) 904; 1 PRdCEEDINGS OF CoNsTrruTioNAL CoNvENn0 Or
INDIANA (1850) 749; 2 PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVE InON OF SouTH CAn-
OLINA (1868) 460.
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body of litigation, involving for the most part questions of statutory inter-
pretation. Although the statutes might well be considered in derogation
of common law,70 the attitude of the courts as a whole has been extremely
liberal to the debtor, a liberality which has been carried so far at times as
to result in apparent injustice to creditors. This judicial enthusiasm is
actuated in part by a sympathy with poor debtors, but the sentimentality
surrounding the concept of "the home" has also had its effect. Many of the
earlier opinions attain lyrical heights when the judges mention the family
hearth, 71 and in a recent case, the unashamed romanticism of this attitude
found expression in a quotation from "Home, Sweet Home."
' 72
One prolific source of litigation has been the definition of statutory terms
providing who and what property is entitled to exemption. The typical
statute does no more than to state in effect that the homestead of each head
of the family shall consist of his dwelling house and its appurtenances within
designated limits of space and value. Judicial interpretation of these pro-
visions appears to accord in general with the fundamental aims of the legis-
lation. Thus, it is usually held that no particular estate in the land is necessary
to entitle one to claim the homestead exemption so long as one has a present
right of occupancy, although the exemption is never good against the holder
of a paramount title.73  Similarly, the terms "householder" and "head of
a family" have been made to include all persons who are under a moral
obligation to support near relatives living under the same roof.1 4  The
70. NuNN, loc. cit. supra note 19.
71. "The dwelling may be a splendid mansion, or a mere cabin or tent, open to
the winds and rains of heaven. If there be either, it is under the protection of the
law . . . " Hemphill. C. J., in Franklin v. Coffee, 18 Tex. 413, 416 (1857). And
see Deere v. Chapman. 25 111. 610, 612 (1861); Iken v. Olenick. 42 Tex. 195, 198
(1875).
72. Cheek v. Walden, 195 N. C. 752, 755, 143 S. E. 465, 466 (1928).
73. Generally, the homestead privilege may be claimed by a lessee [Grattan v.
Trego, 225 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915)], by the holder of a life estate [Wilson v.
Devasher, 204 Ky. 408, 264 S. W. 1057 (1924)], by a tenant by the curtesy who is
in possession of the land [In re Kaufmann, 142 Fed. 898 (E. D. Wis. 1906)], by the
holder of title taken as security [Radford v. Kachman, 27 Ohio App. 86, 160 N. E. 875
(1927)], by the beneficiary of a trust [Jelinek v. Stepan, 41 Minn. 412, 43 N. W. 90
(1889)], by the holder of an equity of redemption [Cheek v. Walden, 195 N. C. 752,
143 S. E. 465 (1928)], and by a person in possession of land under a contract of
purchase [Watson v. Poindexter, 176 Ark. 1065, 5 S. W. (2d) 299 (1928)]. Mere
possession of the land has been held a sufficient basis for exemption. Hill v. First
Nat. Bank, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917). The exemption will not, as a rule, attach
to future interests. Brooks v. Goodwin, 123 Ark. 607, 186 S. W. 67 (1916). Statutes
sometimes provide that a homestead may be claimed in leaseholds. See, e. g., TENN.
CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 7723.
74. Davis v. Miami Beach Bank & Trust Co., 99 Fla. 1282, 128 So. 817 (1930) ; see
Horton v. Gibson, 274 S.W. 292, 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Vance, supra note 2,
at 442. A mere contract relation will not support the exemption. Calhoun v. McLendon,
42 Ga. 405 (1871) (bachelor living with servants).
[Vol. 46 : 102.31032
STATE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION LAWS
"dwelling house" has also been subjected to its share of judicial interpreta-
tion. The usual rule is that while the property to be exempt must be occupied
primarily for residential purposes,75 the homestead right is not lost by the
temporary leasing of a portion of the land,10 or by the fact that the premises
are partially used for business purposes.77 Some courts, however, in pro-
fessing to follow the literal words of the statute, have held that any land
owned by the debtor on which he and his family reside is exempt from his
debts, provided it does not exceed the statutory limits.78 Such a rule permits
the exemption of purely business structures and leads to particularly un-
fortunate results in those jurisdictions which place no restriction other than
extent upon the homestead, 79 or which merely provide that its monetary
value shall not exceed a certain sum at the date of its designation, thus
enabling the debtor to hold large sums exempt from his creditors by investing
them in improvements upon the premises.s
In the absence of express statutory provisions, the courts are called upon
to decide what steps must be taken by the debtor in order to become entitled
to the exemption. An actual intention to place the land to homestead uses
is always a prerequisite, and this must be manifested by overt acts before
it can become effective8 1 Occupancy of the land will usually fulfill this
requirement,12 while in some states, the mere intent to occupy certain lands
as a homestead, when coupled with overt acts of preparation, is held sufficient
if actual occupancy follows within a reasonable period.a A similar question
75. Harris v. Carlson, 201 Iowa 169, 205 N. ,V. 202 (1925); see VAPLms, op. cit.
.supra note 1, at 6.
76. Succession of Veronie, 147 La. 12, 84 So. 439 (1920). Statutes sometimes pro-
vide that the temporary renting of the homestead will not vitiate the exemption ro
long as no other homestead has been acquired. See, e.g., OmA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931)
§ 1643.
77. McKay v. Gesford, 163 Cal. 243, 124 Pac. 1016 (1912) (premises used as a
hotel) ; Rush v. Gordon, 38 Kan. 535, 16 Pac. 700 (1888) (grocery store in lower
story). Some statutes provide that a shop located on the premises and used by the
owner in his daily business is properly appurtenant to the homestead. See, e.g., IowA
CODE (1935) § 10137.
78. In re Tertelling, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,842 (C. C. D. Kan 1872) (brewery held
exempt); Lockey v. Lockey, 112 Minn. 512, 128 N. ,V. 833 (1910) (homestead could
be claimed in four separate tenements since total area was within statutory limits).
79. See Jacoby v. Parkland Distilling Co., 41 Minn. 227, 43 N. NV. 52 (18S9) (busi-
ness building worth $24,000 declared exempt); Phelps v. Rooney, 9 Wis. 70 (1859)
(business building declared exempt).
80. Chase v. Swayne, 88 Tex. 218, 30 S. ,V. 1049 (1895) (improvements placed on
homestead and valued, at $125,000 declared exempt); King v. Hapgood Shoe Co., 21
Tex. Civ. App. 217, 51 S.V. 532 (1899) (debtor constructed building with non-exempt
funds, for purpose of defrauding creditors).
81. NuNx, op. cit. supra note 19, at 99.
82. Barto v. Kellogg, 289 Ill. 528, 124 N. E. 633 (1919); Evansville Coffin Co. v.
Sumner, 189 Ky. 839, 226 S. XV. 363 (1920).
83. Mandan Mercantile Co. v. Sexton, 29 N. D. 602, 151 N. NV. 70 (1915);
Benzel v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 1 S. XV. (2d) 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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arises as to what is to be deemed an abandonment of the exemption privilege.
It is generally held that the land will not lose its homestead character until
it is actually abandoned by the debtor and his family with the intention of
never again using it as a homestead.84 The burden of proving this intent
is upon him who seeks to show the abandonment, and to meet this burden,
where no new homestead has been acquired, a high degree of proof is
required.8 5 It has often been held, even in the absence of express statutory
authorization, that the proceeds from a voluntary sale of the exempt land
will remain immune from creditors for a reasonable period if held with
the purpose of purchasing a new homestead.80
In certain instances, the courts seem to have been unduly harsh on credi-
tors, although their rulings were not impelled by the literal wording of the
statutes.8 7 The view is taken by many jurisdictions that a contract for the
sale of the homestead is wholly void if it has been entered into without the
consent of the owner's wife, and that consequently the would-be purchaser
can recover no damages for its breach. 88 The equitable rule of marshalling
assets has also been held inapplicable where a homestead right is involved,
so that the debtor may lawfully insist that a creditor whose lien covers the
homestead and other lands as well shall first resort to the non-exempt lands
even though the security of other creditors in the same land is thereby
impaired or destroyed.89 Moreover, the motivating factors behind the selec-
tion of the particular homestead have in large measure been disregarded by
the courts. Thus, a debtor is permitted to purchase a homestead with non-
exempt funds for the express purpose of defeating the just claims of his
creditors,90 or he may designate as his homestead land which he had pre-
viously assured them could be subjected to sale for the non-payment of
his debts.01
84. Dean v. Cole, 141 Ark. 177, 216 S. W. 308 (1919); Ritz v. First Nat. Bank
of Pecos, 234 S.W. 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). In some states a formal declaration
of abandonment is necessary in order to relinquish the exemption privileges. See, e. 9.,
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 54-1007; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFar-
land, 1935) § 6951.
85. Carstens v. Landrum, 5 S. W. (2d) 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); see (1936)
12 Wis. L Rv. 121.
86. Note (1919) 1 A. L. R. 483. It is generally held that property received in
exchange for the homestead is exempt if it is to be used as a family home. Note (1933)
83 A.LR. 54.
87. At one time, the Georgia courts gave a retroactive effect to their statute. See
Chambliss v. Phelps, 39 Ga. 386 (1869); Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 425 (1869).
But the Georgia statute as thus construed was declared unconstitutional. Gunn v. Barry,
15 Wall. 610 (U. S. 1872), rev'g 44 Ga. 351 (1871).
88. Notes (1919) 4 A. L. R. 1272; (1922) 16 A. L. R. 1036.
89. Boyce v. Hawn, 52 S.D. 53, 216 N. W. 589 (1927) ; Burg v. Hitzfield, 89 S. W.
(2d) 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
90. Hale v. Richards, 80 Iowa 164, 45 N.W. 734 (1890); Dotson-Murray Fruit
Co. v. Liebrand, 143 Kan. 72, 53 P. (2d) 487 (1936).
91. Jacoby v. Parkland Distilling Co., 41 Minn. 227, 43 N. W. 52 (1889).
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Although homestead laws were American in origin, they are now paral-
leled by more or less similar legislation elsewhere, the similarity being most
marked where conditions resemble those of the western portions of the
United States. In Alaska, the debtor is given an exemption up to one
hundred and sixty acres of rural land or one-quarter of an acre in the city,
but the total value of either cannot exceed $2,500.02 Hawaii permits an
exemption of one acre of land whose value along with that of the buildings
situated thereon is limited to $1,000.03 In the Philippines and Porto Rico,
no other limitation is set upon the homestead than that of value, the limit
in the former case being 150 pesos, and in the latter, $500." Laws closely
resembling the American model have been passed in the Canadian provinces
of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and in New
Zealand and South Australia 5 Brazil and Venezuela have also enacted laws
which are similar to ours except that they set no fixed limits upon the
homesteadY5
In Europe, a strong movement for homestead exemption laws has existed
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, caused by the prevailing
economic distress of that period, which proved the ruin of many small cul-
tivators and drove them to the cities.0 7 A primary purpose of these laws,
apart from their humanitarian objectives, was to stimulate the culture of
the soil and to prevent the depopulation of rural areas, although in France,
Belgium and Switzerland they were also connected with housing programs.P
The European homestead laws usually demand registration of the lands and
other formalities as a prerequisite to gaining the exemption, and also, as a
probable result of their agrarian tendencies, place far greater restrictions on
the alienation and encumbrance of the homestead than is done in the United
States.
Switzerland in 1907 was the first European country to pass a homestead
exemption law modelled after the American type.03 This law, which did not
92. AriAs Comp. LAws (1933) §3723.
93. HAwAn REv. LAws (1935) § 4169.
94. PmL CoDn Civ. Pnoc. (Fisher, 1925) §452; P. R. Comp. REv. STAT. & Co=
(1913) §§ 1000-1005.
95. 2 ALDRTA REv. STAT. (1922) 1113-1115; 1 BnxrsH CoLULWMA REv. SmT.
(1924) 1345-1348; 2 Ifxrroa, REv. STAT. (1913) 1025-1029; 1 SAs.ATc=- r= Rnv.
STAT. (1930) 801-808; 3 NEW ZEA.ALND Pumac Acrs (1903-1931) 292-293; South
Australia Laws 1895, no. 10.
96. Brazil: Law No. 3,071 of January 1, 1916, 1916 CoDico Crvm. art. 5§70-73;
Venezuela: CODIGO Crvm (June 26, 1922) art. 614-624.
97. RoTzE, op. cit. suPra note 2, at 26.
98. 3 Wouap, LEmEDuca DES BOncmGucHr REcaTs (9th ed. 1932) 319. Thas
laws apparently have not proved popular in France and Switzerland. In France, omly
249 families had established homesteads by 1921. See Btrr= Aim UA vn, Hefr-
stattenrecht in 4 REcHrsvzanxxcanE1Dzs HAND6w2SMBucH (1933) 221.
99. Swiss CIvM CODP (1907) (Schick, 1915) art. 349-359.
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become effective until 1912, empowers the cantons, on application by the
prospective homesteader, to create rural or urban homesteads subject to
certain limitations. No restrictions are laid upon the amount or value of
the land permitted to be held as exempt, save that it cannot exceed the size
necessary to furnish reasonable support to the owner and his family. The
rights of existing creditors are carefully protected, for notice of the appli-
cation for the exemption must be published, special notice being required
for all lien holders, and if any creditors object, the homestead may not be
created until the debts owed them have been paid. Furthermore, the exemp-
tion does not become effective until it is entered in the land register, which
is published officially as an added safeguard for future creditors. The land
can neither be alienated nor encumbered once it has been impressed with
the homestead character, but the owner can procure the dissolution of the
exemption by petitioning the proper official, which petition must be published
in order to give notice to all interested parties before the cancellation may
be decreed. The immediate family of the owner is further protected by the
peculiar provision that the homesteader can be forced to provide a shelter
for his blood relatives in the ascending and descending lines, and also for
his brothers and sisters, if in abject poverty and worthy of support. The
homestead exemption ceases at the death of the owner unless he has given
directions in his will for its continuance. The privilege of exemption cannot
pass by intestacy.
The French homestead law of 1909 closely resembles that of Switzerland
except that the value of the property is limited to 8,000 francs at the time
of its designation as a homestead. 100 This statute also safeguards creditors
by requiring that notice of the application for the exemption be published
in a newspaper at certain intervals for a period of two months before the
application itself can be acted upon by a court. The alienation or encum-
brance of the land is forbidden unless the owner's wife consents before a
justice of the peace, or if no wife survives and there are minor children,
the "family council" must consent, which it is admonished not to do unless
the children will clearly benefit thereby. Where the homesteader dies leav-
ing minor children, the justice of the peace may at his discretion decree the
continuance of the exemption until the youngest child attains his majority.
The German homestead law of May 10, 1920, is not restricted to agri-
cultural holdings, but one of its primary purposes appears to be agrarian.10 1
A homestead is created either by the purchase of land from the so-called
"Ausgeber"' 10 2 or by an agreement with the "Ausgeber" whereby land al-
100. France: 2 CODES ET Lois POUR LA FRANCE ET LES COLONIES (Colin. 20th ed.
1925) 1359-1360.
101. Germany: Law of May 10, 1920, 1920 REICHSrESETZLATT 962. The German Con-
stitution of 1919 provides for such legislation. REICInSVERuASSUNG (August 11, 1919)
art 155. See 3 WOLFF, op. cit. supra note 98, at 319-322.
102. The "Ausgeber" may be the Reich, one of the particular states, a municipality,
or a duly authorized public corporation.
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ready owned by the beneficiary takes on the homestead character. In either
event, severe restrictions are placed upon the homesteader's power to deal
freely with his land. He can neither divide nor encumber it without the
consent of the "Ausgeber." The "Ausgeber" is also empowered to buy the
land in cases where an attempt is made to sell it to anyone save a near
relative, or where the owner desires to deed the land away as a gift, does
not reside permanently upon it, fails to cultivate it, or does so "badly. Once
the homestead is created, the land is exempt from all creditors save mort-
gagees.
An Egyptian law of 1912 is also agrarian in scope, since it restricts the
privilege of exemption to those cultivators who own no more than five feddans
of land and includes two drawing animals and all necessary agricultural
implements. 0 3 By this law, the debtor is not permitted to renounce the
exemption. Homestead laws are also to be found in several of the Balkan
countries.' 0 4 These laws are likewise confined to restricting the sale or
encumbrance of agricultural lands.
The most significant recent development in this field is to be found in a
movement in the United States to exempt the homestead from taxation.
This trend, having its origin in the recent difficulties of home owners,":
has thus far been embodied in the constitutions or laws of nine states, with
exemptions ranging from $1,000 to $5,000 of the actual or assessed value
of the homestead. 10 6 Two other states have provisions either for the assess-
ment of homesteads at a lower percentage of real value or for their taxation
at a lower percentage of their assessed value.10 7
103. Egypt: Law No. 31 of 1912, 2 CODEs EownruNs (Wathelet & Brunton, 1919)
553.
104. For a collection of the various laws, see BEa-mrT AND MAYEI!, op. cit. supra
note 98, at 226-229.
105. See Logan, Oklahoma Tax Exemption Law (1936) 14 TAx MAo. 79.
106. ARK. CONsT. amend. 23, adopted Nov. 3, 1936 ($1,000 exemption, which legis-
lature may increase to $2,500); F. CoNsr. art. X, §7 ($5,000 exemption); Lt.
CoxST. art. X, §4 ($2,000 exemption); Miss. Laws Ex. Sess. 1935, c. 22 ($2,00
exemption); N. M. CoxsT. art VIII, §5 (legislature may exempt up to $2,500);
N. C. CoNsT. art. V, § 5; N. C. Pub. Laws 1935, c. 444 (legislature may exempt up to
$1,000) ; Oi.A. CONST. art. XIII, § 13673 a-b (legislature is empowered to determine
amount of exemption; this amount may not be decreased for twenty years, but may be
increased); Trx. CONsT. art. VIII, § la ($3,000 exemption); UTAH Co NsT. art. XIII,
§2, S.J.R. No.2 (Feb. 5, 1935) (legislature may exempt up to 2,00D).
In all of these states, with the exception of Utah, the exemption is apparently based
upon the assessed valuation of the land.
Constitutional amendments providing for homestead tax exemptions were rejected
by referenda in Arkansas and Michigan in 1932 and in New Mexico in 1935. RnsEArca
DEPARTMENT, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE CouNcIL, HOMESTEAD TAx ExMron (Pre-
liminary Statement 1936) 5.
107. MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 1993. The first $4,000 in value in all
homesteads is assessed at 20% of true value if unplatted, and at 25% if platted. Other
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The chief legal problem raised by these provisions which has as yet been
passed upon by the courts is whether homesteads can constitutionally be
released from taxation altogether.108 It has been held in several recent cases
that they must remain taxable at least to contribute to the payment of interest
and principal on bonded debts issued prior to the enactment of the exemption
provisions.10 9 As a result, exemption laws may prove of advantage to the
bondholders who can mandamus a tax levy on homesteads which will be
wholly for their benefit. Indeed, the claim has been made that the Florida
tax exemption statute was promoted by bondholders.1 10
The justification for the tax exemption statutes is based -largely on the
same grounds as those advanced in support of the older homestead laws:
it is hoped that they will encourage home ownership as a means of pre-
serving the family, high moral standards, and democratic institutions, attract
outsiders into the state, and induce local residents to remain. 1 It can also
be urged that since the exemption will result in a proportionately greater
reduction in taxes for the owner of low-valued than of high-valued property,
these statutes' will aid in correcting the almost universal tendency to assess
low-valued property at a higher percentage of full value than high-valued
property, thus bringing the tax system more nearly into accord with the
principle of ability to pay.112
On the other hand, the statutes are open to several serious objections.
One of the most important is their probable effect on governmental revenue.118
real estate is assessed at 40% if platted and at 33 1/3% if unplatted. This statute has
been upheld by the courts. Apartment Operators Ass'n v. Minneapolis, 191 Minn. 365,
254 N. W. 443 (1934), (1934) 18 MINN. L Rav. 751; Logan v. Young, 191 Minn. 371,
254 N.W. 446 (1934). W. VA. CoNsT. art. X, § 1. Homesteads are taxed at 1% of
their assessed value. Non-homestead property is taxed at 1 1/2% if without, and at
2% if within a municipality.
108. Other problems which are likely to vex the courts include such questions as
what constitutes ownership within the meaning of the statutes, and what parties shall
be entitled to bring suit in order to enforce or enjoin the levying of taxes upon home-
stead property. See Comment (1937) 15 N. C. L. REV. 211.
109. Folks v. County of Marion, 121 Fla. 17, 163 So. 298 (1935); State v. City of
Pensacola, 123 Fla. 331, 166 So. 851 (1936); State v. City of Orlando, 170 So. 887
(Fla. 1936) ; Keeney v. County Court, 115 W. Va. 243, 175 S. E. 60 (1934).
110. RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note
106, at 13-14; see Tampa Daily Times, Oct. 10, 1934, p. 6, col. 1.
111. Brandis, Proposed Changes in the State Constitution (April, 1936) in 3 PoPu-
LAa GOV'T 17. Doubts have been expressed as to the efficacy of these laws in attracting
non-residents into the state. See RESEAaCH DEPARTMENT, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
op. dt. supra note 106, at 15.
112. See INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE OF UTAH GOVERNMENTAL UNITS, REPORT oz
THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTON PROPOSAL (1936) 147.
113. Mississippi is one of the states for which a full year's actual experience with
homestead exemption is available. With a $1,000 exemption [Miss. Laws 1934, c. 191],
the exempt property was approximately 9% of the total property assessment. REsEARcH
DEPARTMENT, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Op. cit. supra note 106, Supplementary
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The total amount of homestead property may be comparatively insignifi-
cant as a source of state income;'114 but, while actual experience is still
lacking, several surveys have been made which indicate that the loss of revenue
will fall most heavily on the counties and school districts, and will in many
instances be so great as to necessitate their being financed in part by the
state, unless assessments or taxes are increased.""0 The problem of reim-
bursing the various units will be particularly difficult, for the 8urveys show
that the reduction in revenue will vary greatly from one taxing district to
another of the same grade, since local districts having a high percentage of
tenancy, or of public utility property, or which consist of a few extensive
holdings of real estate will be less affected than those consisting of a large
number of holdings assessed at approximately the exemption amount. In
general, it can be supposed that the smaller and poorer city and county
governments will lose relatively the most.10 Louisiana appears to be the
only state which at the present time has made adequate provisions for the
reimbursement of the local taxing units. This reimbursement is made. on
the basis of their actual loss which is directly attributable to the exemption,
and is to be paid from a "Property Tax Relief Fund" to whose credit the
proceeds of certain taxes are to be deposited. The amounts of the various
exemptions are made dependent upon the size of the fund thus available,
but in no case may they exceed $2,000.11.
Apart from the financial difficulties which the tax exemption laws may
cause for local taxing units, it may be questioned whether the exemptions
will make for a desirable allocation of the tax burden. This will of course
depend upon the type of tax with which the lost revenues are to be re-
placed.118 In this connection, it may be noted that home owners as a class
Report at 22-23. The Mississippi legislature subsequently increa-e the exemption to
;2,500. Miss. Laws Ex. Sess. 1935, c. 22.
114. See RrsARtcH DaAxnm=r, KANSAs LG.sLATrvaw Coumca, op. d. supra
note 106, Suppldmentary Report at 9; I-vETIGATnTG Co.rrLrM oF UTAU GOVe=-
ImtmNAL Urrs, op. cit. supra note 112, at 54; Brandis, supra note 111, at 18.
115. According to the Alabama survey, only five counties would show a curremt
operating surplus in the general fund if an exemption of $2,000 were adopted. Kzon'r,
Emcr or PROPoSED Hoasx Exruerron (1936) 7; see Logan, supra note 105,
at 80.
116. See RFmsEAcn DEPAmTENT, KANSAS LE.LATIVE CoUNCm, op. cit. tura
note 106, Supplementary Report at 25-26.
117. LA. CoNsT. art. X, k4; LA. GENr. STAT. Aom. (Dart, Supp. 1935) 9 OS05 .1-.5.
The state has thus far been able to provide only for a $1,000 exemption. 'This is pwe-
sibly the result of a tendency on the part of the local assessors to aess amr-este.ds
at the maximum exemption allowance, thus increasing the amount of rcimbr;==zt
due from the state to the various counties. Communication received by the YAm L.7
JouRNAL from the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Dec. 26, 1936.
118. Martin, Social Aspects of Tax Exemption (Jan. 1936) Amr.s 43, 53.
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are frequently among the more prosperous members of the commuiity, so
that the property tax, with all its inequalities, tends to conform more nearly
to the principle of ability to pay than the sales tax, a measure to which
state legislatures have recently been quite willing to turn in their efforts to
overcome deficits.119
Criticisms may also be voiced on other scores. In the first place, the
exemption laws appear to offer numerous opportunities for tax evasion. For
example, it will undoubtedly prove difficult to prevent nominal transfers
of property whereby individuals without bona fide homesteads will secure
tax exemptions for large land owners.1 2 0 And since it is generally held that
occupancy of land under a contract to purchase confers homestead rights,
many landlords may be able to escape taxation by changing from a rental
to a "contract to purchase" basis, which will give a homestead status to
rented property.121 Secondly, it can be contended that a mere tax exemption
will enable but few persons to become homesteaders, since it can prove of
no advantage to those who have not as yet accumulated sufficient capital.
1 22
Finally, if it is desirable to encourage home ownership by offering monetary
inducements, a direct subsidy would seem preferable to a tax exemption,
the exact amount of which is difficult to determine and which is in the nature
of a continuing subsidy not subject to periodic review, so that it may con-
tinue long after it has ceased to be justified.
1 2 3
It may be that the social needs served by the homestead exemption move-
ment, embodied in legislation all over the world, and warmly supported by
the courts, have become less urgent and universal, in view of the changing
status of tie family,1 24 and the revolution which has taken place in the habit
of home ownership. Homestead exemption laws serve little purpose in great
cities where most housing is rented ;1215 it seems safe to predict that whatever
utility such legislation will have in the future will be restricted largely to
119. See SELIGMAN, EssAYs IN TAXATION (9th ed. 1921) 478; RESEARCH DEPART-
MENT, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Op. cit. supra note 106, at 8; Salt Lake Tribune,
Feb. 7, 1936, p. 20, col. 1.
120. Martin, loc. cit. supra note 118.
121. RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, op. Cit. supra note 106,
Supplementary Report at 12; see note 73, supra.
122. Logan, supra note 105, at 80.
123. See RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Op. cit. supra
note 106, at 8.
124. See WALLIS AND WILLEY, READINGS IN SOCIOLOGY (1930) 403-404, 408-410.
125. A homestead may generally be claimed in leaseholds, but it provides no pro-
tection against the claims of the landlord. See THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 176;
note 73, supra. In view of the relatively short duration of a term for years, the
exemption could hardly prove of great advantage to the debtor. See WAPLES, Op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 115.
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